2008年2月
February 2008
发布 Arc 之后引发的激烈反弹,带来了一个意想不到的后果:它让我意识到自己有一套设计哲学。那些言辞犀利的批评者,最主要的抱怨在于 Arc 看起来太单薄了。我做了好几年,拿出来的成果居然只有几千行宏?为什么我不去解决一些更实质性的问题?
The fiery reaction to the release of Arc had an unexpected consequence: it made me realize I had a design philosophy. The main complaint of the more articulate critics was that Arc seemed so flimsy. After years of working on it, all I had to show for myself were a few thousand lines of macros? Why hadn't I worked on more substantial problems?
当我琢磨这些言论时,突然觉得它们似曾相识。当年人们对 Viaweb、对 Y Combinator,以及对我写的大多数文章,最初的评价也是一模一样的。
As I was mulling over these remarks it struck me how familiar they seemed. This was exactly the kind of thing people said at first about Viaweb, and Y Combinator, and most of my essays.
我们刚推出 Viaweb 时,风险投资人和电子商务“专家”都觉得它是个笑话。我们只是蜗居在公寓里的几个人,在 1995 年,这可不像现在这样酷。而且在我们做出的东西里,据他们所知,甚至都称不上是软件。在他们眼里,软件就等于庞大、笨重的 Windows 应用程序。因为 Viaweb 是他们见过的第一个基于 Web 的应用,所以看起来无非就是一个网站。当他们发现 Viaweb 甚至不处理信用卡交易时(第一年我们确实没做),就更瞧不起它了。在他们看来,交易处理才是电子商务的核心,听起来又严肃又困难。
When we launched Viaweb, it seemed laughable to VCs and e-commerce "experts." We were just a couple guys in an apartment, which did not seem cool in 1995 the way it does now. And the thing we'd built, as far as they could tell, wasn't even software. Software, to them, equalled big, honking Windows apps. Since Viaweb was the first web-based app they'd seen, it seemed to be nothing more than a website. They were even more contemptuous when they discovered that Viaweb didn't process credit card transactions (we didn't for the whole first year). Transaction processing seemed to them what e-commerce was all about. It sounded serious and difficult.
然而,神秘的是,Viaweb 最终把所有的竞争对手都击垮了。
And yet, mysteriously, Viaweb ended up crushing all its competitors.
人们对 Y Combinator 的最初反应也几乎如出一辙。它看起来轻量得有些可笑。创业融资意味着 A 轮融资:在经过数月严肃、商务化的会议后,根据一英尺厚的文件中规定的条款,将数百万美元给少数几家由资历深厚的创始人创办的创业公司。Y Combinator 看起来微不足道。虽然现在说 Y Combinator 会不会像 Viaweb 那样还为时过早,但从模仿者的数量来看,很多人显然认为我们走对路了。
The initial reaction to Y Combinator was almost identical. It seemed laughably lightweight. Startup funding meant series A rounds: millions of dollars given to a small number of startups founded by people with established credentials after months of serious, businesslike meetings, on terms described in a document a foot thick. Y Combinator seemed inconsequential. It's too early to say yet whether Y Combinator will turn out like Viaweb, but judging from the number of imitations, a lot of people seem to think we're on to something.
我无法衡量自己的文章是否成功,除了页面浏览量以外,但人们对它们的反应至少和刚开始时不一样了。起初,Slashdot 上的黑子们默认的反应是(翻译成体面的话就是):“这家伙是谁?他有什么资格写这些话题?我还没读过这篇文章,但这么短、文风这么随意的文章,怎么可能对某某话题提出什么有用的见解呢?在这个领域里,有学位的人都已经写了好多本厚书了。”现在,新一代的网站上有了新一代的黑子,但他们至少不再问第一句“这家伙是谁”了。
I can't measure whether my essays are successful, except in page views, but the reaction to them is at least different from when I started. At first the default reaction of the Slashdot trolls was (translated into articulate terms): "Who is this guy and what authority does he have to write about these topics? I haven't read the essay, but there's no way anything so short and written in such an informal style could have anything useful to say about such and such topic, when people with degrees in the subject have already written many thick books about it." Now there's a new generation of trolls on a new generation of sites, but they have at least started to omit the initial "Who is this guy?"
现在人们对 Arc 的评价,和他们当初对 Viaweb、Y Combinator 以及我大多数文章的评价一模一样。为什么会有这种规律?我意识到答案在于,这四件事的做事方法(m.o.)是完全相同的。
Now people are saying the same things about Arc that they said at first about Viaweb and Y Combinator and most of my essays. Why the pattern? The answer, I realized, is that my m.o. for all four has been the same.
就是这套方法:我喜欢寻找(a)针对(b)被忽视的、且(c)确实需要解决的问题的(d)简单解决方案,并(e)尽可能非正式地交付它们,(f) 从一个非常粗糙的 1.0 版本开始,然后快速迭代。
Here it is: I like to find (a) simple solutions (b) to overlooked problems (c) that actually need to be solved, and (d) deliver them as informally as possible, (e) starting with a very crude version 1, then (f) iterating rapidly.
当我第一次明确列出这些原则时,我注意到一个惊人的事实:这简直就是一份招致冷嘲热讽的“秘方”。虽然简单的解决方案更好,但它们看起来不如复杂的方案那么令人印象深刻。而被忽视的问题,根据定义,就是大多数人认为不重要的问题。以非正式的方式交付解决方案,意味着人们不能通过包装来评判它,而必须真正去理解它,这需要付出更多精力。而从一个粗糙的 1.0 版本开始,意味着你最初的成果总是又小又不完整。
When I first laid out these principles explicitly, I noticed something striking: this is practically a recipe for generating a contemptuous initial reaction. Though simple solutions are better, they don't seem as impressive as complex ones. Overlooked problems are by definition problems that most people think don't matter. Delivering solutions in an informal way means that instead of judging something by the way it's presented, people have to actually understand it, which is more work. And starting with a crude version 1 means your initial effort is always small and incomplete.
当然,我早就注意到,人们起初似乎永远无法理解新想法。我过去以为这只是因为大多数人太笨了。现在我发现原因不止于此。就像逆向投资(contrarian investment)基金一样,遵循这种策略的人,做的事情在普通人眼里几乎总是错的。
I'd noticed, of course, that people never seemed to grasp new ideas at first. I thought it was just because most people were stupid. Now I see there's more to it than that. Like a contrarian investment fund, someone following this strategy will almost always be doing things that seem wrong to the average person.
和逆向投资策略一样,这恰恰是关键所在。这种方法(从长远来看)之所以成功,是因为它让你获得了其他人为了显得“正统”而放弃的所有优势。如果你去解决被忽视的问题,你更有可能发现新事物,因为你的竞争更少。如果你非正式地交付解决方案,你(a)省去了所有为了让它们看起来高大上而必须付出的精力,并且(b)避免了既欺骗观众又欺骗自己的危险。而如果你发布一个粗糙的 1.0 版本然后进行迭代,你的解决方案就能借助“自然”的想象力——正如费曼所指出的,自然的想象力比你自己的想象力要强大得多。
As with contrarian investment strategies, that's exactly the point. This technique is successful (in the long term) because it gives you all the advantages other people forgo by trying to seem legit. If you work on overlooked problems, you're more likely to discover new things, because you have less competition. If you deliver solutions informally, you (a) save all the effort you would have had to expend to make them look impressive, and (b) avoid the danger of fooling yourself as well as your audience. And if you release a crude version 1 then iterate, your solution can benefit from the imagination of nature, which, as Feynman pointed out, is more powerful than your own.
就 Viaweb 而言,简单的解决方案是让软件在服务器上运行。被忽视的问题是自动生成网站;在 1995 年,网店都是由人类设计师手工制作的,但我们知道这无法规模化。真正起决定性作用的部分是网页设计,而不是交易处理。非正式的交付方式就是我,穿着牛仔裤和 T 恤出现在零售商的办公室里。而那个粗糙的 1.0 版本,如果我没记错的话,在我们发布时还不到 10,000 行代码。
In the case of Viaweb, the simple solution was to make the software run on the server. The overlooked problem was to generate web sites automatically; in 1995, online stores were all made by hand by human designers, but we knew this wouldn't scale. The part that actually mattered was graphic design, not transaction processing. The informal delivery mechanism was me, showing up in jeans and a t-shirt at some retailer's office. And the crude version 1 was, if I remember correctly, less than 10,000 lines of code when we launched.
这种方法的威力不仅限于创业公司、编程语言和文章。它大概适用于任何形式的创造性工作。在绘画中当然也可以使用:塞尚和克利正是这么做的。
The power of this technique extends beyond startups and programming languages and essays. It probably extends to any kind of creative work. Certainly it can be used in painting: this is exactly what Cezanne and Klee did.
在 Y Combinator,我们用真金白银押注于此,从某种意义上说,我们鼓励我们资助的创业公司也以这种方式工作。好想法往往近在咫尺。所以,去寻找那些被别人忽视的简单事物吧——那些人们事后会说“显而易见”的东西——尤其是当人们被过时的陈规俗套误导,或者因为试图做一些表面上高大上的事情而走入歧途的时候。搞清楚真正的问题是什么,并确保你解决了它。不要担心让自己看起来像个正规大公司;长远来看,产品才是取胜的关键。并且尽早发布,这样你就能开始从用户那里了解你真正应该做的是什么。
At Y Combinator we bet money on it, in the sense that we encourage the startups we fund to work this way. There are always new ideas right under your nose. So look for simple things that other people have overlooked—things people will later claim were "obvious"—especially when they've been led astray by obsolete conventions, or by trying to do things that are superficially impressive. Figure out what the real problem is, and make sure you solve that. Don't worry about trying to look corporate; the product is what wins in the long term. And launch as soon as you can, so you start learning from users what you should have been making.
Reddit 是这种方法的一个经典例子。Reddit 刚推出时,看起来简陋无比。在不懂设计的人眼里,它刻意保持的极简设计简直就像是没有设计。但 Reddit 解决了真正的问题:告诉人们有什么新鲜事,除此之外绝不干扰用户。结果,它获得了巨大的成功。现在,当传统观念也跟上它的步伐时,这一切看起来就顺理成章了。人们看着 Reddit,觉得创始人只是运气好。就像所有这类事情一样,它做起来比看起来要难得多。Reddit 的创始人们顶着逆流奋力拼搏,最终彻底扭转了水流的方向;以至于现在看起来,他们仿佛只是在顺流漂流。
Reddit is a classic example of this approach. When Reddit first launched, it seemed like there was nothing to it. To the graphically unsophisticated its deliberately minimal design seemed like no design at all. But Reddit solved the real problem, which was to tell people what was new and otherwise stay out of the way. As a result it became massively successful. Now that conventional ideas have caught up with it, it seems obvious. People look at Reddit and think the founders were lucky. Like all such things, it was harder than it looked. The Reddits pushed so hard against the current that they reversed it; now it looks like they're merely floating downstream.
所以,当你看着像 Reddit 这样的东西并心想“我要是能想到这样的点子就好了”时,请记住:这样的点子就在你身边。你之所以忽视了它们,只是因为它们看起来不靠谱。
So when you look at something like Reddit and think "I wish I could think of an idea like that," remember: ideas like that are all around you. But you ignore them because they look wrong.