(本文整理自作者在 2007 年 Startup School 和伯克利 CSUA 上的演讲。)

(This essay is derived from talks at the 2007 Startup School and the Berkeley CSUA.)

我们创办 Y Combinator 已经有足够长的时间,积累了一些关于成功率的数据。我们在 2005 年夏天的第一期孵化班里有八家创业公司。现在看来,这八家公司中至少有四家成功了。其中三家已被收购:Reddit 是由两家公司(Reddit 和 Infogami)合并而成的,第三家被收购的公司我们目前还不能透露。那一期还有一家公司是 Loopt,他们现在发展得非常好,如果他们愿意,大概花个十分钟就能把自己卖掉。

We've now been doing Y Combinator long enough to have some data about success rates. Our first batch, in the summer of 2005, had eight startups in it. Of those eight, it now looks as if at least four succeeded. Three have been acquired: Reddit was a merger of two, Reddit and Infogami, and a third was acquired that we can't talk about yet. Another from that batch was Loopt, which is doing so well they could probably be acquired in about ten minutes if they wanted to.

因此,在不到两年前的那个夏天,第一批创始人中大约有一半现在已经变富了——至少按他们的标准来说是这样。(当你变富时,你会学到的一件事就是,富裕也是分很多等级的。)

So about half the founders from that first summer, less than two years ago, are now rich, at least by their standards. (One thing you learn when you get rich is that there are many degrees of it.)

我还不准备预测我们的成功率会一直保持在 50% 这么高。第一期可能只是个特例。但我们应该能做得比外界经常引用(且大概率是编造的)10% 这一标准成功率要好。我觉得把目标定在 25% 是比较稳妥的。

I'm not ready to predict our success rate will stay as high as 50%. That first batch could have been an anomaly. But we should be able to do better than the oft-quoted (and probably made up) standard figure of 10%. I'd feel safe aiming at 25%.

即使是失败的创始人,日子似乎也过得不赖。在最初的八家创业公司中,有三家现在可能已经关门了。其中两家,创始人在夏天结束时就直接去做了别的事情。我觉得这段经历并没有给他们留下什么心理阴影。最接近痛苦失败的是 Kiko,创始人们坚持做了一整年,最后被 Google Calendar 彻底击垮。但他们最终的结局很圆满。他们在 eBay 上以 25 万美元的价格卖掉了他们的软件。在还清天使投资人的钱后,他们每个人还剩下一年的薪水。[1] 接着,他们立刻着手创办了一家全新且更令人兴奋的创业公司:Justin.TV

Even the founders who fail don't seem to have such a bad time. Of those first eight startups, three are now probably dead. In two cases the founders just went on to do other things at the end of the summer. I don't think they were traumatized by the experience. The closest to a traumatic failure was Kiko, whose founders kept working on their startup for a whole year before being squashed by Google Calendar. But they ended up happy. They sold their software on eBay for a quarter of a million dollars. After they paid back their angel investors, they had about a year's salary each. [1] Then they immediately went on to start a new and much more exciting startup, Justin.TV.

所以这里有一个更惊人的统计数据:第一期创始人中,遭遇惨败的概率是 0%。像所有创业公司一样,他们经历过起起落落,但我认为没有人会愿意用这段经历去换一份格子间里的安稳工作。而且这个统计数据可能并不是特例。无论我们长期的成功率最终是多少,我想那些后悔没有去找份普通工作的人的比例,都会一直接近 0%。

So here is an even more striking statistic: 0% of that first batch had a terrible experience. They had ups and downs, like every startup, but I don't think any would have traded it for a job in a cubicle. And that statistic is probably not an anomaly. Whatever our long-term success rate ends up being, I think the rate of people who wish they'd gotten a regular job will stay close to 0%.

对我来说,最大的谜团是:为什么没有更多的人去创办创业公司?如果几乎每个创业的人都觉得这比普通工作更好,而且有相当比例的人变富了,为什么不是每个人都想做这件事?很多人以为我们每期会收到几千份申请,实际上我们通常只收到几百份。为什么没有更多的人申请?虽然在关注这个圈子的人看来,创业公司似乎正如雨后春笋般涌现,但与拥有必要技能的人数相比,这个数量依然微乎其口。绝大多数程序员毕业后依然直接走进格子间,并一直待在那里。

The big mystery to me is: why don't more people start startups? If nearly everyone who does it prefers it to a regular job, and a significant percentage get rich, why doesn't everyone want to do this? A lot of people think we get thousands of applications for each funding cycle. In fact we usually only get several hundred. Why don't more people apply? And while it must seem to anyone watching this world that startups are popping up like crazy, the number is small compared to the number of people with the necessary skills. The great majority of programmers still go straight from college to cubicle, and stay there.

人们似乎没有做出符合自身最大利益的选择。这是怎么回事?关于这一点,我或许可以解答。由于 Y Combinator 处于风险投资流程的最前端,我们可能是世界上最了解那些“纠结于要不要创办一家公司”的人的心理专家。

It seems like people are not acting in their own interest. What's going on? Well, I can answer that. Because of Y Combinator's position at the very start of the venture funding process, we're probably the world's leading experts on the psychology of people who aren't sure if they want to start a company.

犹豫不决并没有错。如果你是一个正在考虑创业、但在迈出这一步前犹豫不决的黑客,你其实承袭了一个伟大的传统。拉里和谢尔盖在创办 Google 之前似乎也有过同样的感受,杨致远和费罗在创办雅虎之前也是如此。事实上,我猜最成功的创业公司往往是由那些犹豫不决的黑客创立的,而不是那些满腔热血的商科狂热分子。

There's nothing wrong with being unsure. If you're a hacker thinking about starting a startup and hesitating before taking the leap, you're part of a grand tradition. Larry and Sergey seem to have felt the same before they started Google, and so did Jerry and Filo before they started Yahoo. In fact, I'd guess the most successful startups are the ones started by uncertain hackers rather than gung-ho business guys.

我们有证据支持这一观点。我们资助过的几家最成功的创业公司,后来告诉我们,他们是在最后一刻才决定申请的。有些甚至是在截止日期前几个小时才做出的决定。

We have some evidence to support this. Several of the most successful startups we've funded told us later that they only decided to apply at the last moment. Some decided only hours before the deadline.

应对不确定性的方法是将其拆解。大多数不愿做某事的人,脑子里都混杂着大约八个不同的理由,连他们自己都分不清哪个影响最大。有些理由是合理的,有些则是虚妄的,但除非你清楚各自的比例,否则你无法判断你的犹豫到底在多大程度上是合理的,又在多大程度上是自己吓自己。

The way to deal with uncertainty is to analyze it into components. Most people who are reluctant to do something have about eight different reasons mixed together in their heads, and don't know themselves which are biggest. Some will be justified and some bogus, but unless you know the relative proportion of each, you don't know whether your overall uncertainty is mostly justified or mostly bogus.

因此,我打算列出人们不愿创业的所有顾虑,并解释哪些是真实的。这样,准创始人就可以把这当作一份清单,来审视自己的内心感受。

So I'm going to list all the components of people's reluctance to start startups, and explain which are real. Then would-be founders can use this as a checklist to examine their own feelings.

我承认我的目标是增加你的自信。但这与通常的“打鸡血”式建立自信的练习有两个不同之处。一是我的出发点是诚实的。大多数做“励志”生意的人,在你买下他们的书或付费参加他们夸赞你有多棒的讲座时,就已经达到了他们的目的。而如果我鼓励了不该创业的人去创业,我自己的日子就会变得难过。如果我鼓励了太多人申请 Y Combinator,只会增加我的工作量,因为我得去读完所有的申请书。

I admit my goal is to increase your self-confidence. But there are two things different here from the usual confidence-building exercise. One is that I'm motivated to be honest. Most people in the confidence-building business have already achieved their goal when you buy the book or pay to attend the seminar where they tell you how great you are. Whereas if I encourage people to start startups who shouldn't, I make my own life worse. If I encourage too many people to apply to Y Combinator, it just means more work for me, because I have to read all the applications.

另一个不同之处在于我的方法。我不会一味地积极,而是会采取“否定”的态度。我不会对你说“加油,你行的”,而是会剖析你没有行动的所有原因,并证明为什么其中大多数(但非全部)都应该被忽略。我们先从每个人与生俱来的第一个顾虑开始。

The other thing that's going to be different is my approach. Instead of being positive, I'm going to be negative. Instead of telling you "come on, you can do it" I'm going to consider all the reasons you aren't doing it, and show why most (but not all) should be ignored. We'll start with the one everyone's born with.

1. 太年轻

1. Too young

很多人认为自己太年轻,不适合创业。许多人确实没说错。全球人口的年龄中位数大概是 27 岁,所以可能三分之一的人都可以理直气壮地说自己太年轻。

A lot of people think they're too young to start a startup. Many are right. The median age worldwide is about 27, so probably a third of the population can truthfully say they're too young.

多年轻算太年轻?创办 Y Combinator 的目标之一,就是去探寻创业者年龄的下限。我们总觉得投资人在这方面过于保守——他们总想投资教授,而实际上他们应该投资研究生,甚至是本科生。

What's too young? One of our goals with Y Combinator was to discover the lower bound on the age of startup founders. It always seemed to us that investors were too conservative here—that they wanted to fund professors, when really they should be funding grad students or even undergrads.

通过不断试探这个极限,我们发现的最大收获并不是极限在哪里,而是这个界限有多么模糊。下限可能低至 16 岁。我们不考虑 18 岁以下的人,只是因为未成年人在法律上无法签署合同。但目前为止我们资助过的最成功的创始人山姆·奥特曼(Sam Altman),当时只有 19 岁。

The main thing we've discovered from pushing the edge of this envelope is not where the edge is, but how fuzzy it is. The outer limit may be as low as 16. We don't look beyond 18 because people younger than that can't legally enter into contracts. But the most successful founder we've funded so far, Sam Altman, was 19 at the time.

不过,山姆·奥特曼是一个特例。当他 19 岁时,他的躯壳里仿佛住着一个 40 岁的心灵。而有些 19 岁的人,心理年龄其实只有 12 岁。

Sam Altman, however, is an outlying data point. When he was 19, he seemed like he had a 40 year old inside him. There are other 19 year olds who are 12 inside.

我们用“成年人”这个词来特指超过一定年龄的人,是有原因的。你会跨过一道门槛。传统上这道门槛被定在 21 岁,但不同的人跨过它的年龄大相径庭。只要你跨过了这道门槛,无论你多大,你都足够成熟去创业了。

There's a reason we have a distinct word "adult" for people over a certain age. There is a threshold you cross. It's conventionally fixed at 21, but different people cross it at greatly varying ages. You're old enough to start a startup if you've crossed this threshold, whatever your age.

你怎么判断呢?成年人有几种测试方法。实际上,我是在遇到山姆·奥特曼之后才意识到这些测试存在的。我注意到,和他的交流感觉像是在和一个年长得多的人谈话。事后我想,我到底在衡量什么?是什么让他看起来更成熟?

How do you tell? There are a couple tests adults use. I realized these tests existed after meeting Sam Altman, actually. I noticed that I felt like I was talking to someone much older. Afterward I wondered, what am I even measuring? What made him seem older?

成年人使用的一种测试是:你是否还保留着小孩子的“推脱本能”。当你是个小孩子时,如果被要求做一件难事,你可以哭着说“我做不到”,大人大概就会放过你。小孩子有一个魔法按钮,只要说“我还是个孩子”就可以摆脱大多数困难的处境。而成年人,根据定义,是不允许临阵脱逃的。当然,他们有时还是会逃避,但一旦如此,他们就会被社会无情地淘汰。

One test adults use is whether you still have the kid flake reflex. When you're a little kid and you're asked to do something hard, you can cry and say "I can't do it" and the adults will probably let you off. As a kid there's a magic button you can press by saying "I'm just a kid" that will get you out of most difficult situations. Whereas adults, by definition, are not allowed to flake. They still do, of course, but when they do they're ruthlessly pruned.

判断一个人是否成年的另一种方法是看他们对挑战的反应。一个还未成年的人,在面对成年人的挑战时,往往会做出默认对方权威的反应。如果一个成年人说“这是个愚蠢的想法”,小孩子要么夹着尾巴溜走,要么反叛。但反叛和顺从一样,都默认了自己处于弱势地位。成年人对“这是个愚蠢的想法”的反应,是直视对方的眼睛,平淡地问:“真的吗?你为什么这么想?”

The other way to tell an adult is by how they react to a challenge. Someone who's not yet an adult will tend to respond to a challenge from an adult in a way that acknowledges their dominance. If an adult says "that's a stupid idea," a kid will either crawl away with his tail between his legs, or rebel. But rebelling presumes inferiority as much as submission. The adult response to "that's a stupid idea," is simply to look the other person in the eye and say "Really? Why do you think so?"

当然,有很多成年人在面对挑战时依然表现得很幼稚。但你很少能见到面对挑战时表现得像个成年人一样的小孩子。一旦你遇到了,那他就是一个成年人,无论他实际年龄多大。

There are a lot of adults who still react childishly to challenges, of course. What you don't often find are kids who react to challenges like adults. When you do, you've found an adult, whatever their age.

2. 缺乏经验

2. Too inexperienced

我曾写过,创业公司创始人至少应该 23 岁,人们在创业前应该先去别的公司工作几年。我现在不再相信这一点了,改变我看法的是我们资助过的那些创业公司的实例。

I once wrote that startup founders should be at least 23, and that people should work for another company for a few years before starting their own. I no longer believe that, and what changed my mind is the example of the startups we've funded.

我依然认为 23 岁是比 21 岁更好的年龄。但如果你只有 21 岁,获取经验的最好方法就是去创业。所以,看似矛盾的是,如果你因为缺乏经验而不敢创业,你反而应该去创业。这比找一份普通工作能更高效地解决经验不足的问题。事实上,找一份普通工作反而可能削弱你创业的能力,因为它把你驯化成了温室里的动物,让你觉得工作必须有办公室,写代码必须有产品经理来指手画脚。

I still think 23 is a better age than 21. But the best way to get experience if you're 21 is to start a startup. So, paradoxically, if you're too inexperienced to start a startup, what you should do is start one. That's a way more efficient cure for inexperience than a normal job. In fact, getting a normal job may actually make you less able to start a startup, by turning you into a tame animal who thinks he needs an office to work in and a product manager to tell him what software to write.

真正让我确信这一点的是 Kiko 的创始人们。他们一大学毕业就创业了。由于缺乏经验,他们犯了很多错误。但一年后,当我们资助他们的第二个创业项目时,他们已经变得极其强大。他们绝对不是被驯化的动物。如果他们那一年是在微软、甚至在 Google 工作,他们绝不可能成长得如此迅速。他们可能依然只是唯唯诺诺的初级程序员。

What really convinced me of this was the Kikos. They started a startup right out of college. Their inexperience caused them to make a lot of mistakes. But by the time we funded their second startup, a year later, they had become extremely formidable. They were certainly not tame animals. And there is no way they'd have grown so much if they'd spent that year working at Microsoft, or even Google. They'd still have been diffident junior programmers.

所以现在我会建议人们,大学毕业后就直接去创业。年轻是承担风险的最佳时机。当然,你大概率会失败。但即使是失败,也会比找一份普通工作让你更快地达到终极目标。

So now I'd advise people to go ahead and start startups right out of college. There's no better time to take risks than when you're young. Sure, you'll probably fail. But even failure will get you to the ultimate goal faster than getting a job.

说这话让我有点担心,因为这实际上是在建议人们通过让我们亏钱来完成自我教育,但这就是事实。

It worries me a bit to be saying this, because in effect we're advising people to educate themselves by failing at our expense, but it's the truth.

3. 决心不够

3. Not determined enough

作为创业公司创始人,要取得成功需要极大的决心。这可能是预测成功最准确的单一指标。

You need a lot of determination to succeed as a startup founder. It's probably the single best predictor of success.

有些人可能确实没有足够的决心来坚持到底。我很难下定论,因为我是一个决心极强的人,以至于我无法想象那些缺乏决心的人脑子里在想些什么。但我知道他们确实存在。

Some people may not be determined enough to make it. It's hard for me to say for sure, because I'm so determined that I can't imagine what's going on in the heads of people who aren't. But I know they exist.

大多数黑客可能低估了自己的决心。我看到很多人在适应了经营创业公司之后,决心变得明显更强了。我能想到我们资助过的几个人,他们起初如果能以 200 万美元的价格被收购就会谢天谢地,但现在他们却一门心思想着主导世界。

Most hackers probably underestimate their determination. I've seen a lot become visibly more determined as they get used to running a startup. I can think of several we've funded who would have been delighted at first to be bought for $2 million, but are now set on world domination.

既然连拉里和谢尔盖一开始对创办公司都犹豫不决,你又如何判断自己是否有足够的决心呢?这只是我的猜测,但我认为测试标准在于你是否有足够强烈的动力去开发自己的项目。尽管拉里和谢尔盖可能不确定自己是否想开公司,但他们看起来绝不是那种唯唯诺诺、对导师言听计从的温顺助教。他们动手开发了自己的项目。

How can you tell if you're determined enough, when Larry and Sergey themselves were unsure at first about starting a company? I'm guessing here, but I'd say the test is whether you're sufficiently driven to work on your own projects. Though they may have been unsure whether they wanted to start a company, it doesn't seem as if Larry and Sergey were meek little research assistants, obediently doing their advisors' bidding. They started projects of their own.

4. 不够聪明

4. Not smart enough

作为创始人,你可能需要适度的聪明才能成功。但如果你在担心这个问题,你大概是想多了。如果你足够聪明到会去担心自己可能不够聪明来创业,那你大概就已经足够聪明了。

You may need to be moderately smart to succeed as a startup founder. But if you're worried about this, you're probably mistaken. If you're smart enough to worry that you might not be smart enough to start a startup, you probably are.

而且在任何情况下,创业都不需要那么高的智商。有些创业公司确实需要,比如要写出 Mathematica 你必须精通数学。但大多数公司做的都是更接地气的事情,决定性因素是付出多少汗水,而不是智商。硅谷可能会扭曲你在这方面的看法,因为这里有一种“崇拜聪明”的文化。不够聪明的人至少也会装得很聪明。但如果你认为变富需要极高的智商,不妨去纽约或洛杉矶那些更奢华的街区待上两天看看。

And in any case, starting a startup just doesn't require that much intelligence. Some startups do. You have to be good at math to write Mathematica. But most companies do more mundane stuff where the decisive factor is effort, not brains. Silicon Valley can warp your perspective on this, because there's a cult of smartness here. People who aren't smart at least try to act that way. But if you think it takes a lot of intelligence to get rich, try spending a couple days in some of the fancier bits of New York or LA.

如果你觉得自己不够聪明,无法创办一家做高难度技术的公司,那就去写企业软件。企业软件公司不是技术公司,它们是销售公司,而销售主要取决于你有多拼命。

If you don't think you're smart enough to start a startup doing something technically difficult, just write enterprise software. Enterprise software companies aren't technology companies, they're sales companies, and sales depends mostly on effort.

5. 对商业一无所知

5. Know nothing about business

这是另一个权重应该为零的变量。你不需要懂任何商业知识就能创业。初期的焦点应该完全放在产品上。在这个阶段,你唯一需要知道的就是如何做出人们想要的东西。如果你成功了,你才需要考虑如何从中赚钱。但这非常简单,你完全可以边做边学。

This is another variable whose coefficient should be zero. You don't need to know anything about business to start a startup. The initial focus should be the product. All you need to know in this phase is how to build things people want. If you succeed, you'll have to think about how to make money from it. But this is so easy you can pick it up on the fly.

我因为告诉创始人“只要做出伟大的东西,不要太担心怎么赚钱”而承受了不少非议。然而,所有的实证经验都指向这一点:几乎 100% 做出了受欢迎产品的创业公司,最终都成功赚到了钱。收购方私下里也告诉我,他们买下创业公司并不是为了营收,而是为了其战略价值。这意味着,因为他们做出了人们想要的东西。收购方知道这个规则对他们同样适用:如果用户热爱你,你总能想办法变现;如果用户不爱你,世界上最聪明的商业模式也救不了你。

I get a fair amount of flak for telling founders just to make something great and not worry too much about making money. And yet all the empirical evidence points that way: pretty much 100% of startups that make something popular manage to make money from it. And acquirers tell me privately that revenue is not what they buy startups for, but their strategic value. Which means, because they made something people want. Acquirers know the rule holds for them too: if users love you, you can always make money from that somehow, and if they don't, the cleverest business model in the world won't save you.

那么,为什么有这么多人跟我争论呢?我认为原因之一是,他们讨厌“一群二十出头的年轻人靠做一些酷炫却不赚钱的东西就能变富”这个想法。他们只是不希望这种事情成为可能。但这种可能性有多大,并不取决于他们有多不希望它发生。

So why do so many people argue with me? I think one reason is that they hate the idea that a bunch of twenty year olds could get rich from building something cool that doesn't make any money. They just don't want that to be possible. But how possible it is doesn't depend on how much they want it to be.

有一段时间,听到自己被描述成某种不负责任的花衣魔笛手,把涉世未深的年轻黑客带上不归路,这让我挺烦恼的。但现在我意识到,这种争议恰恰是一个好想法的征兆。

For a while it annoyed me to hear myself described as some kind of irresponsible pied piper, leading impressionable young hackers down the road to ruin. But now I realize this kind of controversy is a sign of a good idea.

最有价值的真理,往往是大多数人不相信的那些。它们就像被低估的股票。如果你从它们开始,你将独占整个赛道。因此,当你发现一个你深信是好主意、但大多数人不同意的想法时,你不仅应该忽略他们的反对,还应该朝着那个方向大步迈进。在这种情况下,这意味着你应该去寻找那些会受欢迎、但看起来很难赚钱的想法。

The most valuable truths are the ones most people don't believe. They're like undervalued stocks. If you start with them, you'll have the whole field to yourself. So when you find an idea you know is good but most people disagree with, you should not merely ignore their objections, but push aggressively in that direction. In this case, that means you should seek out ideas that would be popular but seem hard to make money from.

我们愿意赌上一笔种子轮:你不可能做出一个大受欢迎、而我们却想不出办法帮它变现的产品。

We'll bet a seed round you can't make something popular that we can't figure out how to make money from.

6. 没有联合创始人

6. No cofounder

没有联合创始人是一个实实在在的问题。创业对一个人来说太沉重了。尽管我们在很多问题上与其他投资人意见相左,但在这一点上我们完全一致。无一例外,所有的投资人更倾向于投资有联合创始人的项目,而不是单枪匹马的创始人。

Not having a cofounder is a real problem. A startup is too much for one person to bear. And though we differ from other investors on a lot of questions, we all agree on this. All investors, without exception, are more likely to fund you with a cofounder than without.

我们资助过两位单一创始人,但在两种情况下,我们都建议他们的首要任务是寻找联合创始人。他们也都照做了。但我们更希望他们在申请之前就有联合创始人。对于一个刚刚获得资助的项目来说,找一个联合创始人并不是极难的事,而我们更希望联合创始人有足够的决心,在项目还处于极难阶段时就加入进来。

We've funded two single founders, but in both cases we suggested their first priority should be to find a cofounder. Both did. But we'd have preferred them to have cofounders before they applied. It's not super hard to get a cofounder for a project that's just been funded, and we'd rather have cofounders committed enough to sign up for something super hard.

如果你没有联合创始人,该怎么办?去找一个。这比其他任何事情都重要。如果你的居住地没有人愿意和你一起创业,那就搬到有这种人的地方去。如果没有人愿意在你的当前想法上与你合作,那就换一个别人愿意参与的想法。

If you don't have a cofounder, what should you do? Get one. It's more important than anything else. If there's no one where you live who wants to start a startup with you, move where there are people who do. If no one wants to work with you on your current idea, switch to an idea people want to work on.

如果你还在学校,你身边到处都是潜在的联合创始人。毕业几年后,寻找他们就会变得更加困难。不仅你的人才池变小了,而且大多数人已经有了工作,甚至要养家糊口。因此,如果你在大学里有一起策划过创业的朋友,尽可能与他们保持联系。这有助于让梦想保持活力。

If you're still in school, you're surrounded by potential cofounders. A few years out it gets harder to find them. Not only do you have a smaller pool to draw from, but most already have jobs, and perhaps even families to support. So if you had friends in college you used to scheme about startups with, stay in touch with them as well as you can. That may help keep the dream alive.

你有可能通过用户组或会议之类的活动遇到联合创始人。但我不会太乐观。你必须和一个人一起工作过,才能知道自己是否想让他成为联合创始人。[2]

It's possible you could meet a cofounder through something like a user's group or a conference. But I wouldn't be too optimistic. You need to work with someone to know whether you want them as a cofounder. [2]

从中应该吸取的真正教训不是如何寻找联合创始人,而是你应该在年轻、且身边到处都是同类人的时候去创业。

The real lesson to draw from this is not how to find a cofounder, but that you should start startups when you're young and there are lots of them around.

7. 没有好的想法

7. No idea

从某种意义上说,没有好的想法并不是问题,因为大多数创业公司最终都会改变他们的想法。在 Y Combinator 的平均水平看,一个创业公司在前三个月结束时,大约 70% 的想法都是全新的。有时甚至是 100%。

In a sense, it's not a problem if you don't have a good idea, because most startups change their idea anyway. In the average Y Combinator startup, I'd guess 70% of the idea is new at the end of the first three months. Sometimes it's 100%.

事实上,我们如此确信创始人比初始想法更重要,以至于我们打算在这一期申请中尝试一些新东西。我们将允许人们在完全没有想法的情况下进行申请。如果你愿意,你可以在申请表上关于“你打算做什么”的问题中回答“我们毫无头绪”。如果你看起来真的很优秀,我们依然会录取你。我们有信心和你坐下来,一起琢磨出一些有前景的项目。

In fact, we're so sure the founders are more important than the initial idea that we're going to try something new this funding cycle. We're going to let people apply with no idea at all. If you want, you can answer the question on the application form that asks what you're going to do with "We have no idea." If you seem really good we'll accept you anyway. We're confident we can sit down with you and cook up some promising project.

这实际上只是把我们已经在做的事情制度化了。我们对想法本身并不太看重。我们询问想法主要是出于礼貌。我们在申请表上真正关心的问题,是问你做过什么酷炫的东西。如果你做出来的东西是一个有前景的创业公司的第一版,那再好不过,但我们主要关心的,是你是否擅长动手做东西。作为某个流行开源项目的核心开发者,其分量几乎不亚于此。

Really this just codifies what we do already. We put little weight on the idea. We ask mainly out of politeness. The kind of question on the application form that we really care about is the one where we ask what cool things you've made. If what you've made is version one of a promising startup, so much the better, but the main thing we care about is whether you're good at making things. Being lead developer of a popular open source project counts almost as much.

如果你获得了 Y Combinator 的资助,这个问题就解决了。但在一般情况下呢?因为从另一种意义上说,如果你没有想法,这确实是个问题。如果你在没有想法的情况下创业,你下一步该做什么?

That solves the problem if you get funded by Y Combinator. What about in the general case? Because in another sense, it is a problem if you don't have an idea. If you start a startup with no idea, what do you do next?

所以这里有一个寻找创业想法的简易配方:寻找你生活中缺失的东西,然后去满足这个需求——无论它看起来多么因人而异。斯蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克为自己造了一台电脑,谁能想到会有那么多其他人也想要呢?一个窄而真切的需求,比一个宽泛却虚构的需求是更好的起点。所以,即使问题仅仅是你周六晚上约不到人,如果你能想出一种通过写软件来解决这个问题的方法,你就摸到门路了,因为很多其他人也有同样的烦恼。

So here's the brief recipe for getting startup ideas. Find something that's missing in your own life, and supply that need—no matter how specific to you it seems. Steve Wozniak built himself a computer; who knew so many other people would want them? A need that's narrow but genuine is a better starting point than one that's broad but hypothetical. So even if the problem is simply that you don't have a date on Saturday night, if you can think of a way to fix that by writing software, you're onto something, because a lot of other people have the same problem.

8. 市场太挤,容不下更多创业公司

8. No room for more startups

很多人看着日益增加的创业公司数量,会想“这不可持续”。在他们的想法中隐含着一个谬误:认为创业公司的数量存在某种上限。但这是不对的。没有人会声称在 1000 人的公司里拿薪水工作的人数有上限。那为什么在 5 人的公司里拿股权工作的人数就该有上限呢?[3]

A lot of people look at the ever-increasing number of startups and think "this can't continue." Implicit in their thinking is a fallacy: that there is some limit on the number of startups there could be. But this is false. No one claims there's any limit on the number of people who can work for salary at 1000-person companies. Why should there be any limit on the number who can work for equity at 5-person companies? [3]

几乎每一个工作的人都在满足某种需求。把公司拆成更小的单元并不会让这些需求消失。现有的需求通过一个由创业公司构成的网络,可能会比通过几个庞大、层级森严的组织更高效地得到满足。但我认为这并不意味着机会变少了,因为满足当前的需求会衍生出更多的需求。在个人身上,情况确实往往如此。这也没什么不对。我们现在视作理所当然的东西,在中世纪国王看来都是极其娇气的奢侈品,比如一整栋一年四季都温暖如春的建筑。如果一切顺利,我们的子孙后代也会将我们认为奢侈得令人震惊的东西视为理所当然。物质财富没有绝对的标准。医疗保健就是其中的一部分,光是这一项就是一个无底洞。在可预见的未来,人们对物质财富的需求会不断增长,因此公司——特别是创业公司——可做的工作是无限的。

Nearly everyone who works is satisfying some kind of need. Breaking up companies into smaller units doesn't make those needs go away. Existing needs would probably get satisfied more efficiently by a network of startups than by a few giant, hierarchical organizations, but I don't think that would mean less opportunity, because satisfying current needs would lead to more. Certainly this tends to be the case in individuals. Nor is there anything wrong with that. We take for granted things that medieval kings would have considered effeminate luxuries, like whole buildings heated to spring temperatures year round. And if things go well, our descendants will take for granted things we would consider shockingly luxurious. There is no absolute standard for material wealth. Health care is a component of it, and that alone is a black hole. For the foreseeable future, people will want ever more material wealth, so there is no limit to the amount of work available for companies, and for startups in particular.

通常,这种“空间有限”的谬误不会被直接表达出来。它通常隐含在类似“Google、微软和雅虎能收购的创业公司就那么多”这样的言论中。也许吧,尽管收购方的名单远比这三家要长。而且无论你对其他收购方怎么看,Google 并不傻。大公司购买创业公司的原因,是因为后者创造了有价值的东西。既然人们对财富的渴望没有上限,那么大公司可以收购的有价值的创业公司的数量,又为什么会有上限呢?也许在单个收购方能消化多少家创业公司上存在实际限制,但只要存在价值——即创始人愿意放弃未来增值以换取即时套现——收购方就会进化出吞下它的能力。市场在这些方面是非常聪明的。

Usually the limited-room fallacy is not expressed directly. Usually it's implicit in statements like "there are only so many startups Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo can buy." Maybe, though the list of acquirers is a lot longer than that. And whatever you think of other acquirers, Google is not stupid. The reason big companies buy startups is that they've created something valuable. And why should there be any limit to the number of valuable startups companies can acquire, any more than there is a limit to the amount of wealth individual people want? Maybe there would be practical limits on the number of startups any one acquirer could assimilate, but if there is value to be had, in the form of upside that founders are willing to forgo in return for an immediate payment, acquirers will evolve to consume it. Markets are pretty smart that way.

9. 需要养家糊口

9. Family to support

这个理由是真实的。我不会建议任何有家庭的人去创业。我不是说这是个坏主意,只是我不想承担给出这个建议的责任。我愿意承担责任去告诉 22 岁的人去创业。就算失败了又怎样?他们能学到很多东西,而且如果他们需要,微软的那份工作依然在等着他们。但我可不想去惹恼他们的母亲。

This one is real. I wouldn't advise anyone with a family to start a startup. I'm not saying it's a bad idea, just that I don't want to take responsibility for advising it. I'm willing to take responsibility for telling 22 year olds to start startups. So what if they fail? They'll learn a lot, and that job at Microsoft will still be waiting for them if they need it. But I'm not prepared to cross moms.

如果你有家庭但仍想创业,你可以先创办一家咨询公司,然后逐渐将其转型为产品公司。从经验来看,成功做到这一点的概率非常小。你不可能通过这种方式做出下一个 Google。但至少你不会失去收入来源。

What you can do, if you have a family and want to start a startup, is start a consulting business you can then gradually turn into a product business. Empirically the chances of pulling that off seem very small. You're never going to produce Google this way. But at least you'll never be without an income.

另一个降低风险的方法是加入一家现有的创业公司,而不是自己创办。作为创业公司的早期员工,在好坏两方面都非常像创始人。你大约相当于 1/n^2 个创始人,其中 n 是你的员工编号。

Another way to decrease the risk is to join an existing startup instead of starting your own. Being one of the first employees of a startup is a lot like being a founder, in both the good ways and the bad. You'll be roughly 1/n^2 founder, where n is your employee number.

和关于联合创始人的问题一样,这里的真正教训是:趁年轻去创业。

As with the question of cofounders, the real lesson here is to start startups when you're young.

10. 已经财务自由

10. Independently wealthy

这是我不去创业的借口。创业压力太大了。如果你不需要钱,为什么还要做这件事?对于每一个“连续创业者”来说,可能都有二十个理智的人会想:“再开一家公司?你疯了吧?”

This is my excuse for not starting a startup. Startups are stressful. Why do it if you don't need the money? For every "serial entrepreneur," there are probably twenty sane ones who think "Start another company? Are you crazy?"

我曾有几次差点创办新的创业公司,但我总是退缩了,因为我不想让自己生命中的四年被各种琐碎的苦差事(schleps)所消耗。我太了解这个行当了,知道你不能三心二意地去做。一个优秀的创业公司创始人之所以如此可怕,就在于他愿意忍受无穷无尽的苦差事。

I've come close to starting new startups a couple times, but I always pull back because I don't want four years of my life to be consumed by random schleps. I know this business well enough to know you can't do it half-heartedly. What makes a good startup founder so dangerous is his willingness to endure infinite schleps.

不过,退休确实存在一点问题。和很多人一样,我喜欢工作。当你变富时,你会发现许多奇怪的烦恼之一,就是你想共事的大多数有趣的人并不富有。他们需要做一些能维持生计的工作。这意味着如果你想和他们做同事,你也必须做一些能维持生计的工作,即使你并不需要。我想这实际上正是许多连续创业者的动力所在。

There is a bit of a problem with retirement, though. Like a lot of people, I like to work. And one of the many weird little problems you discover when you get rich is that a lot of the interesting people you'd like to work with are not rich. They need to work at something that pays the bills. Which means if you want to have them as colleagues, you have to work at something that pays the bills too, even though you don't need to. I think this is what drives a lot of serial entrepreneurs, actually.

这就是为什么我如此热爱在 Y Combinator 工作的原因。这是一个能让我和喜欢的人一起做有趣事情的借口。

That's why I love working on Y Combinator so much. It's an excuse to work on something interesting with people I like.

11. 还没准备好做出长期承诺

11. Not ready for commitment

这是我在二十多岁的大部分时间里没有创业的原因。像那个年龄的许多人一样,我最看重自由。我不愿意做任何需要承诺超过几个月的事情。我也不想做任何像创业那样完全接管我生活的事情。这完全没问题。如果你想把时间花在旅行、在乐队里演出或者其他事情上,这是一个完全合理的、不去创办公司的理由。

This was my reason for not starting a startup for most of my twenties. Like a lot of people that age, I valued freedom most of all. I was reluctant to do anything that required a commitment of more than a few months. Nor would I have wanted to do anything that completely took over my life the way a startup does. And that's fine. If you want to spend your time travelling around, or playing in a band, or whatever, that's a perfectly legitimate reason not to start a company.

如果你创办了一家成功的创业公司,它将消耗你至少三四年的时间。(如果失败了,结束得会快得多。)所以如果你还没准备好承担这种规模的承诺,就不要去做。但是要意识到,如果你找了一份普通的工作,你可能最终在那里的工作时间也和创业一样长,而且你会发现你的业余时间比你预期的要少得多。所以,如果你已经准备好别上员工证去参加新员工入职培训,那么你也可能已经准备好去创业了。

If you start a startup that succeeds, it's going to consume at least three or four years. (If it fails, you'll be done a lot quicker.) So you shouldn't do it if you're not ready for commitments on that scale. Be aware, though, that if you get a regular job, you'll probably end up working there for as long as a startup would take, and you'll find you have much less spare time than you might expect. So if you're ready to clip on that ID badge and go to that orientation session, you may also be ready to start that startup.

12. 需要条理和规章

12. Need for structure

我听说有些人生活中需要条理和规章(structure)。这似乎是“他们需要有人告诉他们该做什么”的委婉说法。我相信这样的人确实存在。有充足的实证:军队、宗教组织等等。他们甚至可能占了大多数。

I'm told there are people who need structure in their lives. This seems to be a nice way of saying they need someone to tell them what to do. I believe such people exist. There's plenty of empirical evidence: armies, religious cults, and so on. They may even be the majority.

如果你是这种人,你可能不应该创业。事实上,你可能甚至不应该去创业公司工作。在一家优秀的创业公司里,很少有人会告诉你该做什么。可能会有一个人职位是 CEO,但在公司发展到大约十二个人之前,不应该有人告诉任何人该做什么。那太没有效率了。每个人都应该在没有人命令的情况下,直接去做他们需要做的事情。

If you're one of these people, you probably shouldn't start a startup. In fact, you probably shouldn't even go to work for one. In a good startup, you don't get told what to do very much. There may be one person whose job title is CEO, but till the company has about twelve people no one should be telling anyone what to do. That's too inefficient. Each person should just do what they need to without anyone telling them.

如果这听起来像是混乱的温床,不妨想想一支足球队。十一个人以相当复杂的方式协同工作,但只有在偶尔的紧急情况下才会有人告诉别人该做什么。曾有记者问大卫·贝克汉姆,在皇家马德里是否存在语言障碍,因为球员们来自大约八个不同的国家。他说这从来不是问题,因为每个人都太优秀了,他们甚至不需要说话。大家都知道怎么做才是对的。

If that sounds like a recipe for chaos, think about a soccer team. Eleven people manage to work together in quite complicated ways, and yet only in occasional emergencies does anyone tell anyone else what to do. A reporter once asked David Beckham if there were any language problems at Real Madrid, since the players were from about eight different countries. He said it was never an issue, because everyone was so good they never had to talk. They all just did the right thing.

如何判断自己是否有足够的独立思考能力来创业?如果你对别人暗示你没有这种能力感到愤怒,那么你大概是有的。

How do you tell if you're independent-minded enough to start a startup? If you'd bristle at the suggestion that you aren't, then you probably are.

13. 害怕不确定性

13. Fear of uncertainty

也许有些人之所以不愿创业,是因为他们不喜欢不确定性。如果你去微软工作,你可以相当准确地预测未来几年会是什么样子——事实上,准确得有些过头了。如果你创业,任何事情都可能发生。

Perhaps some people are deterred from starting startups because they don't like the uncertainty. If you go to work for Microsoft, you can predict fairly accurately what the next few years will be like—all too accurately, in fact. If you start a startup, anything might happen.

好吧,如果你为不确定性所困扰,我可以帮你解决这个问题:如果你创业,它大概率会失败。不过严肃地说,这不失为看待整个经历的好方法。作最坏的打算,抱最大的希望。在最坏的情况下,它至少会很有趣。在最好的情况下,你可能会变富。

Well, if you're troubled by uncertainty, I can solve that problem for you: if you start a startup, it will probably fail. Seriously, though, this is not a bad way to think about the whole experience. Hope for the best, but expect the worst. In the worst case, it will at least be interesting. In the best case you might get rich.

只要你付出了认真的努力,没有人会因为创业失败而责怪你。过去可能曾有雇主将这视为你的污点,但现在不会了。我问过大公司的经理们,他们都表示,比起在一家大公司混了同样时间的人,他们更愿意雇佣一个尝试过创业但失败了的人。

No one will blame you if the startup tanks, so long as you made a serious effort. There may once have been a time when employers would regard that as a mark against you, but they wouldn't now. I asked managers at big companies, and they all said they'd prefer to hire someone who'd tried to start a startup and failed over someone who'd spent the same time working at a big company.

投资人也不会因此对你产生成见,只要你不是因为懒惰或无可救药的愚蠢而失败。我听说在其他地方——比如欧洲——失败会带来很大的污名。这里不会。在美国,公司和几乎所有其他东西一样,都是一次性的。

Nor will investors hold it against you, as long as you didn't fail out of laziness or incurable stupidity. I'm told there's a lot of stigma attached to failing in other places—in Europe, for example. Not here. In America, companies, like practically everything else, are disposable.

14. 没意识到自己在逃避什么

14. Don't realize what you're avoiding

在社会上历练过一两年的创始人,比刚走出大学校园的人做得更好,原因之一是他们知道自己正在逃避什么。如果他们的创业公司失败了,他们就不得不去找工作,而他们深知工作有多么糟糕。

One reason people who've been out in the world for a year or two make better founders than people straight from college is that they know what they're avoiding. If their startup fails, they'll have to get a job, and they know how much jobs suck.

如果你在大学期间做过暑期工,你可能以为自己知道工作是什么样子,但你可能并不真正了解。科技公司的暑期工并不是真正的工作。如果你找了一份当服务员的暑期工,那才是真正的工作,因为你必须承担自己的分量。但软件公司雇佣学生过暑假,并不是为了获取廉价劳动力。他们这样做是希望在他们毕业时能招募到他们。所以,虽然如果你能出成果他们会很高兴,但他们并不指望你做出什么。

If you've had summer jobs in college, you may think you know what jobs are like, but you probably don't. Summer jobs at technology companies are not real jobs. If you get a summer job as a waiter, that's a real job. Then you have to carry your weight. But software companies don't hire students for the summer as a source of cheap labor. They do it in the hope of recruiting them when they graduate. So while they're happy if you produce, they don't expect you to.

一旦你毕业后找到一份真正的工作,情况就会改变。那时你就必须证明自己的价值了。由于大公司做的大多数事情都很枯燥,你将不得不做一些枯燥的事情。比起大学,这很容易,但很无聊。起初,在大学里交钱做难事之后,拿钱做容易的事可能看起来很酷。但几个月后,这种新鲜感就会消失。最终,做愚蠢的事情会让人变得消沉,即使它很容易而且你拿到了丰厚的报酬。

That will change if you get a real job after you graduate. Then you'll have to earn your keep. And since most of what big companies do is boring, you're going to have to work on boring stuff. Easy, compared to college, but boring. At first it may seem cool to get paid for doing easy stuff, after paying to do hard stuff in college. But that wears off after a few months. Eventually it gets demoralizing to work on dumb stuff, even if it's easy and you get paid a lot.

这还不是最糟糕的。普通工作最糟糕的一点在于,你被期望在特定时间出现在特定地点。显然,连 Google 也未能免俗。这意味着,每一个做过普通工作的人都可以告诉你,在某些时候你完全没有任何工作欲望,但你仍然不得不去上班,坐在屏幕前假装工作。对于一个热爱工作的人(大多数优秀的黑客都是如此)来说,这简直是折磨。

And that's not the worst of it. The thing that really sucks about having a regular job is the expectation that you're supposed to be there at certain times. Even Google is afflicted with this, apparently. And what this means, as everyone who's had a regular job can tell you, is that there are going to be times when you have absolutely no desire to work on anything, and you're going to have to go to work anyway and sit in front of your screen and pretend to. To someone who likes work, as most good hackers do, this is torture.

在创业公司,你省去了这一切。在大多数创业公司中没有上下班时间的概念。工作和生活融合在了一起。但这样做的好处是,没有人介意你在工作时有自己的生活。在创业公司,大多数时候你可以做任何你想做的事。如果你是创始人,你大部分时间想做的事就是工作。但你永远不需要假装在工作。

In a startup, you skip all that. There's no concept of office hours in most startups. Work and life just get mixed together. But the good thing about that is that no one minds if you have a life at work. In a startup you can do whatever you want most of the time. If you're a founder, what you want to do most of the time is work. But you never have to pretend to.

如果你在大公司的办公室里睡午觉,这看起来很不专业。但如果你正在创业,而你在大白天睡着了,你的联合创始人只会觉得你太累了。

If you took a nap in your office in a big company, it would seem unprofessional. But if you're starting a startup and you fall asleep in the middle of the day, your cofounders will just assume you were tired.

15. 父母希望你成为一名医生

15. Parents want you to be a doctor

相当一部分准创始人可能因为父母的劝阻而放弃了创业。我不是说你不应该听他们的话。每个家庭都有权保留自己的传统,我凭什么去反驳他们?但我会给你几个理由,说明为什么一份安稳的职业可能并不是你父母真正想要的。

A significant number of would-be startup founders are probably dissuaded from doing it by their parents. I'm not going to say you shouldn't listen to them. Families are entitled to their own traditions, and who am I to argue with them? But I will give you a couple reasons why a safe career might not be what your parents really want for you.

一是父母对子女往往比对自己更保守。这实际上是对他们所处境遇的理性反应。父母最终分享子女厄运的程度往往超过分享好运的程度。大多数父母并不介意这一点,这是工作的一部分;但这确实往往使他们过度保守。而在保守的道路上犯错依然是犯错。在几乎所有事情中,回报都与风险成正比。因此,父母在保护孩子免受风险的同时,也在不知不觉中保护他们免受回报。如果他们看清了这一点,他们会希望你承担更多风险。

One is that parents tend to be more conservative for their kids than they would be for themselves. This is actually a rational response to their situation. Parents end up sharing more of their kids' ill fortune than good fortune. Most parents don't mind this; it's part of the job; but it does tend to make them excessively conservative. And erring on the side of conservatism is still erring. In almost everything, reward is proportionate to risk. So by protecting their kids from risk, parents are, without realizing it, also protecting them from rewards. If they saw that, they'd want you to take more risks.

父母可能犯错的另一个原因是,就像将军一样,他们总是在打上一场战争。如果他们想让你成为医生,十有八九不仅是因为他们想让你救死扶伤,还因为这是一份体面且收入丰厚的职业。[4] 但它的收入和体面程度已经不如他们观念形成时的那个年代了。当我在七十年代还是个孩子的时候,医生是最顶尖的职业。当时存在一个由医生、奔驰 450SL 和网球构成的黄金三角。现在这三个角看起来都相当过时了。

The other reason parents may be mistaken is that, like generals, they're always fighting the last war. If they want you to be a doctor, odds are it's not just because they want you to help the sick, but also because it's a prestigious and lucrative career. [4] But not so lucrative or prestigious as it was when their opinions were formed. When I was a kid in the seventies, a doctor was the thing to be. There was a sort of golden triangle involving doctors, Mercedes 450SLs, and tennis. All three vertices now seem pretty dated.

那些希望你成为医生的父母可能只是没有意识到时代发生了多么大的变化。如果你成了史蒂夫·乔布斯,他们真的会那么不高兴吗?所以,我认为对待父母关于你该做什么的意见,应该像对待“功能需求”一样。即使你的唯一目标是让他们高兴,方法也不是简单地给他们他们所要求的东西。相反,想想他们为什么要提出这个要求,看看是否有更好的方法来满足他们的核心诉求。

The parents who want you to be a doctor may simply not realize how much things have changed. Would they be that unhappy if you were Steve Jobs instead? So I think the way to deal with your parents' opinions about what you should do is to treat them like feature requests. Even if your only goal is to please them, the way to do that is not simply to give them what they ask for. Instead think about why they're asking for something, and see if there's a better way to give them what they need.

16. 找一份工作是默认选项

16. A job is the default

这就引出了人们去找普通工作的最后一个、也可能是最强大的原因:这是默认要做的事。默认选项的力量无比强大,恰恰是因为它们在没有进行任何有意识选择的情况下起作用。

This leads us to the last and probably most powerful reason people get regular jobs: it's the default thing to do. Defaults are enormously powerful, precisely because they operate without any conscious choice.

对几乎所有人(除了罪犯)来说,“如果你需要钱,你就应该去找份工作”似乎是一个公理。实际上,这个传统也不过一百多年的历史。在此之前,默认的谋生方式是务农。将只有一百年历史的东西当作公理是很糟糕的计划。按照历史标准来看,这是一种正在迅速发生变化的事情。

To almost everyone except criminals, it seems an axiom that if you need money, you should get a job. Actually this tradition is not much more than a hundred years old. Before that, the default way to make a living was by farming. It's a bad plan to treat something only a hundred years old as an axiom. By historical standards, that's something that's changing pretty rapidly.

我们现在可能正在目睹另一场这样的变革。我读过很多经济史,对创业圈也相当了解,现在在我看来,我们相当有可能正在目睹一场类似于从农业向制造业转变的变革的开始。

We may be seeing another such change right now. I've read a lot of economic history, and I understand the startup world pretty well, and it now seems to me fairly likely that we're seeing the beginning of a change like the one from farming to manufacturing.

你知道吗?如果在这场变革开始时(大约在 1000 年左右的欧洲)你就在场,在几乎所有人看来,跑到城市去发财都是一件疯狂的事情。虽然农奴在原则上被禁止离开他们的庄园,但逃到城市应该没有那么难。村子周围并没有巡逻的守卫。阻止大多数农奴离开的原因,是这看起来风险极高。离开自己的土地?离开相处了一辈子的人,去一个住着三四千个完全陌生人的大城市生活?你该怎么生活?如果你不种地,你该怎么获得食物?

And you know what? If you'd been around when that change began (around 1000 in Europe) it would have seemed to nearly everyone that running off to the city to make your fortune was a crazy thing to do. Though serfs were in principle forbidden to leave their manors, it can't have been that hard to run away to a city. There were no guards patrolling the perimeter of the village. What prevented most serfs from leaving was that it seemed insanely risky. Leave one's plot of land? Leave the people you'd spent your whole life with, to live in a giant city of three or four thousand complete strangers? How would you live? How would you get food, if you didn't grow it?

尽管这在当时让他们感到恐惧,但现在靠脑力生活已经成了我们的默认选项。所以,如果创业对你来说似乎风险很大,想想你的祖先曾觉得像我们现在这样生活是多么冒险。奇妙的是,最清楚这一点的人,恰恰是那些试图让你固守旧模式的人。拉里和谢尔盖自己都没有去找工作,他们怎么能说你应该去当他们的员工呢?

Frightening as it seemed to them, it's now the default with us to live by our wits. So if it seems risky to you to start a startup, think how risky it once seemed to your ancestors to live as we do now. Oddly enough, the people who know this best are the very ones trying to get you to stick to the old model. How can Larry and Sergey say you should come work as their employee, when they didn't get jobs themselves?

现在我们回顾中世纪的农民,心想他们是怎么忍受过来的。一辈子在同一片土地上耕作,没有任何更好的希望,在领主和牧师的控制下,必须把所有的剩余产出都交出去,并视他们为主子,这该有多么凄惨。如果有一天人们以同样的方式回顾我们认为的正常工作,我不会感到惊讶。每天通勤到某个没有灵魂的写字楼格子间,被一个你不得不承认是老板的人指手画脚——那个人可以把你叫进办公室说“请坐”,你就得坐下!这该有多么凄惨。想象一下,向用户发布软件居然还要请求许可。想象一下,因为周末即将结束,明天不得不起床去上班,而在周日下午感到悲伤。他们是怎么忍受过来的?

Now we look back on medieval peasants and wonder how they stood it. How grim it must have been to till the same fields your whole life with no hope of anything better, under the thumb of lords and priests you had to give all your surplus to and acknowledge as your masters. I wouldn't be surprised if one day people look back on what we consider a normal job in the same way. How grim it would be to commute every day to a cubicle in some soulless office complex, and be told what to do by someone you had to acknowledge as a boss—someone who could call you into their office and say "take a seat," and you'd sit! Imagine having to ask permission to release software to users. Imagine being sad on Sunday afternoons because the weekend was almost over, and tomorrow you'd have to get up and go to work. How did they stand it?

想到我们可能正处于另一个类似于从农业向制造业转变的转折点,真是令人兴奋。这就是我关心创业公司的原因。创业公司之所以有趣,不仅仅是因为它们是赚大钱的一种方式。我对其他赚钱方式(比如证券投机)毫无兴趣。那些最多就像谜题一样有趣。创业公司承载了更多东西。它们可能代表了人类历史上罕见的、财富创造方式的重大历史性转变之一。

It's exciting to think we may be on the cusp of another shift like the one from farming to manufacturing. That's why I care about startups. Startups aren't interesting just because they're a way to make a lot of money. I couldn't care less about other ways to do that, like speculating in securities. At most those are interesting the way puzzles are. There's more going on with startups. They may represent one of those rare, historic shifts in the way wealth is created.

这最终也是促使我们致力于 Y Combinator 的动力。我们想赚钱,哪怕只是为了不至于停止做这件事,但这并不是主要目标。人类历史上只发生过少数几次重大的经济转型。如果能用一个绝妙的“黑客手段”让其中一次转型发生得更快,那将是一件了不起的事。

That's ultimately what drives us to work on Y Combinator. We want to make money, if only so we don't have to stop doing it, but that's not the main goal. There have only been a handful of these great economic shifts in human history. It would be an amazing hack to make one happen faster.

注释

Notes

[1] 唯一亏钱的是我们。天使投资人持有的是可转债,因此他们对拍卖所得拥有优先清偿权。Y Combinator 只收回了每美元 38 美分。

[1] The only people who lost were us. The angels had convertible debt, so they had first claim on the proceeds of the auction. Y Combinator only got 38 cents on the dollar.

[2] 最适合这种交流的组织形式可能是开源项目,但这些项目并不涉及太多面对面的交流。也许值得创办一个有更多面对面交流的开源项目。

[2] The best kind of organization for that might be an open source project, but those don't involve a lot of face to face meetings. Maybe it would be worth starting one that did.

[3] 必须有一定数量的大公司来收购这些创业公司,所以大公司的数量不可能减少到零。

[3] There need to be some number of big companies to acquire the startups, so the number of big companies couldn't decrease to zero.

[4] 思想实验:如果医生做着同样的工作,但成了贫困的边缘群体,还有哪些父母会希望自己的孩子成为医生?

[4] Thought experiment: If doctors did the same work, but as impoverished outcasts, which parents would still want their kids to be doctors?

感谢 Trevor Blackwell、Jessica Livingston 和 Robert Morris 阅读本文草稿,感谢 Zenter 的创始人允许我使用他们尚未发布的网页版 PowerPoint 杀手软件,并感谢伯克利 CSUA 的 Ming-Hay Luk 邀请我发表演讲。

Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this, to the founders of Zenter for letting me use their web-based PowerPoint killer even though it isn't launched yet, and to Ming-Hay Luk of the Berkeley CSUA for inviting me to speak.

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